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Abstract
In this paper we conduct an empirical investigation of how neighborhood mortgage
adoption contagion aects mortgage product choice, with an emphasis on Hispanic
borrowers.
We use loan-level mortgage data for metropolitan areas in California and Florida
during 2004 and 2005, the peak years of the subprime mortgage boom.
We identify an important and statistically signicant eect of contagion on con-
sumer choice of hybrid mortgage products that were popular during this period, espe-
cially for Hispanic borrowers.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the role of externalities in the choice of subprime mortgage products.
In particular, we focus on whether high adoption rates of certain non-traditional mortgage
(NTM) products at a given location aected the origination of similar products in subsequent
periods.1 We term this phenomenon as a neighborhood contagion eect. In addition, we
examine the question of whether the race and ethnicity of the borrower is an important
driver of such contagion eects.
The boom in subprime mortgages since the early 2000s has been the topic of much interest
and research (see GAO, 2010 for an overview). Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2009) observe
that an overwhelming majority|over 75 percent|of subprime mortgages originated over
the 2003-2007 period were so-called short-term hybrids. Short-term hybrids are mortgage
products that combine the (initial) payment stream of a xed rate mortgage (FRM) that later
resets into the payment stream of an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM). Subprime mortgage
products 2/28 and 3/27 belong to this category. The 2/28 is a 30-year mortgage product
that comprises an initial FRM for two years followed by an ARM for 28 years. The 3/27 is
dened analogously. Notably, the ARM-leg of most of these mortgage products is scheduled
to reset every 6 months.2
Naturally, short-term hybrid products are signicantly dierent from traditional mort-
gage products. This adds to a widespread perception among academics and policymakers
that most subprime mortgages were originations to borrowers with a lower degree of nancial
sophistication and therefore less likely to have full knowledge and understanding of the terms
and conditions in their mortgage contracts. Several studies supporting this view have at-
tributed these phenomena to the confusion about mortgage terms (Bucks and Pence, 2008),
1Conventional 30-year single-family mortgages which qualify under the underwriting criterion of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are generally classied as traditional mortgages.
2Arguably, this is a key dierence between subprime hybrids and prime hybrids such as the 3/1, 5/1 and
7/1 mortgages, wherein the ARM-leg of the mortgage resets on an annual basis. Subprime hybrids reset at
shorter maturities because they were designed to reduce lender exposure to long term contracts. Repeated
resets were intended to force the borrower into renancing the mortgage (see Gorton 2008; Bhardwaj and
Sengupta, 2011, for details).
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the lack of nancial literacy among borrowers (Gerardi, Goette, and Stephan, 2010) and even
the lack of proper disclosure of mortgage costs (Lacko and Pappalardo, 2007). These ndings
also show that numerical and cognitive ability does not always systematically predict riskier
mortgage choices. Therefore, at least on the borrower side, it remains an open question as
to why so many subprime originations included non-traditional mortgage products, which
expanded at such a rapid pace.
Several explanations have been oered for the rapid expansion of NTMs or short term
hybrids. It is important to note that hybrid mortgage products have been in existence since
the 1980s and have been used in other segments of the mortgage market. But even in the
jumbo and conventional mortgage segments, the rapid growth of hybrids has been a fairly
recent phenomenon. Bhattacharya, Fabozzi, and Berliner (2005) note that the growth of
hybrids is often attributed to a sharp increase in the steepness of the yield curve around 2002.3
The demand for NTMs was also sustained by the strong growth in home prices since 2003
and the declining aordability of home seekers|some of whom used NTMs to expand their
home-buying power (Agnell and Rowley, 2006). Studies of the subprime market have also
noted that a segmentation of the mortgage market in terms of racial and ethnic dierences
resulted in part because lenders specialized across neighborhoods and marketed certain types
of mortgage products more aggressively to minority borrowers, placing them at a higher risk
of obtaining subprime loans (Bocian, Ernst, and Li 2006, 2008; Reid and Laderman 2009).
While there is strong evidence in favor of each of the explanations described above, they do
not reconcile the observed evidence of poor nancial sophistication of subprime borrowers
with the rapid expansion of riskier NTM mortgages.
In this paper, we seek to explain the rapid growth in short term hybrids among subprime
originations in terms of a contagion eect.4 Using loan-level data on subprime mortgage
3The 10-year/2-year spread that averaged -22 basis points in 2000 increased to an average in excess of 200
basis points around 2002. This raised the appeal of hybrid products making home buying more aordable.
The borrowers attain a security of xed payment rates for a short period of 2-3 years at rates signicantly
lower than those of 30-year xed-rate mortgages.
4Again, we emphasize that this is perhaps not the only reason behind the expansion of NTMs in subprime
mortgage. However, as we demonstrate below, there is strong evidence in support of this phenomenon.
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originations we nd that the probability of originating a hybrid product increases with the
share of hybrids originated (as a proportion of total originations) at the same location in
the previous period. Moreover, we nd that this strong increase is signicantly tied to the
ethnicity of the borrower|especially if the borrower is Hispanic. Stated dierently, we nd
that the probability of originating a hybrid product given that the borrower is Hispanic
increases signicantly with the share of hybrids originated to Hispanics (as proportion of
total originations to Hispanics) at the same location in the previous period.
There are several strands of literature that describe the phenomenon observed in our
study. The earliest mention of the spatial concentration of economic activity and related
knowledge spillovers and information ows has been attributed to Marshall (1920). More re-
cently, George and Waldfogel (2003), Waldfogel (2003, 2005) have shown how product choice
and product diversication can be inuenced by the size of the local minority population.
The eects of agglomeration on consumer activity can be robust especially in environments
where language and ethnic barriers form impediments. In particular, proximity to neighbor-
hoods with a high concentration of home owners of the same ethnicity facilitates the diusion
of knowledge of the mortgage application process, likely through expanded word-of-mouth
networks as well as local civic or religious organizations. This feature has been shown to
be critical for Hispanic households facing mortgage and housing decisions (see Haurin and
Rosenthal, 2009, and references therein). In addition, Haurin and Rosenthal (2009) also
point to peer group and role model eects that might inuence a household's nancial de-
cision. These eects bear relevance for our results although our study does not distinguish
between the eects of agglomeration and role model eects.
At the heart of these explanations is the phenomenon whereby the actions of one set
of economic decision makers inuence the purchases and nancial decisions of others. This
form of observational or social learning can dominate private information about products
and contracts leading consumers to act as if they are in an informational cascade (Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1998). Since empirical evidence on observational learning is
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signicantly dicult to obtain, eorts in the literature have concentrated on randomized
natural eld experiments as in Cai, Chen, Fang, and Zhou (2009). While our study alludes
to the fact that individual borrower decisions could be aected by observing others' choices,
it cannot establish the existence of observational learning.
Our study uses a discrete choice model to determine how individual and neighborhood
characteristics determine the choice of mortgage contracts. There are several studies that
analyze mortgage choice in this framework. Using micro data from the 1983 Survey of
Consumer Finances, Gabriel and Rosenthal (1991) suggest that minority households are
signicantly less likely to obtain conventional home loans than white borrowers, even after
controlling for proxies of default risk. Hendershott, LaFayette, and Haurin (1997) in turn
analyzed the joint choice of loan-to-value ratios and mortgage type using data from the 1984
American Housing Survey. They focused on the role of Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) nancing in easing mortgage qualication constraints. The authors did not analyze
credit or demographic factors. Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000) introduced borrower
credit history in the analysis, matching data reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) with data from a credit bureau. They found that credit history plays an
important role in the FHA vs. conventional choice, and while they did not nd that black
borrowers were less likely to select FHA-mortgages than other borrowers, the authors found
that Hispanics were more likely to use FHA than white borrowers.
More recent studies of mortgage choice have focused on the choice of prime vs. nonprime
mortgages. Courchane, Surette, and Zorn (2004) used a survey of prime and subprime bor-
rowers (dened as those with higher credit risk) to study whether subprime borrowers were
being channeled to the subprime segment. They found that subprime borrowers were less
knowledgable about the mortgage process and were less likely to search for the best mortgage
rates. Their results indicate that in addition to typical underwriting factors, Hispanic ethnic-
ity and age are important determinants of market segmentation, and that Hispanic borrowers
and older borrowers may disproportionately nd themselves in the subprime market.
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To the best of our knowledge, ours is one of the rst studies to analyze mortgage product
choice during the recent subprime lending boom. The study closest in spirit to ours is Reid
and Laderman (2009), which also analyzes mortgage choice during the same period, but
their focus is foreclosure outcomes across racial or ethnic groups and they do not consider
neighborhood and contagion eects on the choice of mortgage products. Reid and Laderman
(2009) use HMDA data merged with a proprietary dataset on loan performance collect by
LPS Applied Analytics, Inc., for the period 2004 to 2006 for California.5 They examine
the choice between four mortgage products: prime xed rate mortgages, prime adjustable
rate mortgages, subprime xed rate mortgages, and subprime adjustable rate mortgages.
In the choice decision, the authors emphasize the role of dierent market channels. Their
results indicate that black and Hispanic borrowers in California had access to markedly
dierent markets than comparable white borrowers and this market segmentation played
an important role in their likelihood of receiving a higher-priced loan. The authors also
study the dierences in foreclosure rates across racial or ethnic groups and nd that after
controlling for the choice of mortgage product, the dierences in foreclosures fall considerably,
suggesting that the disparities primarily result from dierential access to lending markets.
In the next section 2, we describe the data sets used in the analysis. In section 3 we
present the methodology. We discuss the results in section 5, and we provide concluding
comments in section 6.
2 Data
In this study, we use two sources of mortgage data. We combine data reported under HMDA
with data on private-label asset backed securities from Core Logic Information Solutions, Inc.
(CL), for California and Florida during 2004 and 2005.
The HMDA data contain limited information on the characteristics of the loan, including
5The LPS dataset is also referred to as the McDash data, since McDash Analytics was the original
compiler.
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the amount, type (conventional or government-backed), purpose (purchase, home improve-
ment, or renancing), and lien status (rst or subordinate). Most of the observations corre-
spond to loans originated in metropolitan areas, as only lenders with assets over a certain
threshold are required to report data on the loans they originate or purchase. The data
set also contains information on the race and ethnicity of the applicants. In this study we
focus on Hispanics, who can be of any race. HMDA data do not include information about
the credit-risk prole of the borrowers other than their income. Finally, the data also con-
tain information on the property associated with the mortgage, such as whether it is owner
occupied and the Census tract and metropolitan area of its location.
The CL data contain extensive information on the characteristics of loans that were se-
curitized in private-label subprime pools. The information on loan characteristics include,
among other variables, the interest rate, the mortgage product type, the terms of the loan
(including information on amortization terms and the reset periods of adjustable rate mort-
gages), and whether the loan has a prepayment penalty or the borrower has been required to
acquire private mortgage insurance. The CL data also provide information on the borrower,
including the FICO credit score, the borrower's reported debt-to-income ratio, and the ex-
tent to which the borrower's income was documented. The information on the property
includes the sale or appraised price, the type of property, and the state and ZIP code of its
location.
The HMDA and CL data sets were matched following the algorithm described by Haugh-
wout, Mayer, and Tracy (2009). The procedure uses the loan originator names, the loan
amounts, as well as the dates of originations, and also involves associating ZIP codes with




In this section we describe our methodology for determining the borrowers' choice of mort-
gage product. Our motivation here is to examine the determinants of the choice of hybrid
mortgage products, dened above as 2/28 and 3/27 mortgages. As mentioned earlier, al-
though hybrids (such as the 3/1, 5/1 and 7/1) have been in existence in other segments of
the U.S. mortgage market, the 2/28 and 3/27 products in particular were unique to the
subprime product universe.
We model the mortgage choice problem with a standard probit regression. We assume
that the dierence between the benet and cost of adopting a hybrid product over all other
product types can be denoted in terms of an unobserved variable y. Therefore the net utility







kt + zkt 1 + uikt (1)
where xit is a set of contemporaneous borrower and loan characteristics, wkt is a set of
geographic characteristics, and zkt 1 is a scalar measure of contagion dened at the Census
tract level. Following standard conventions of the index function model, we dene our probit
estimation procedure in terms of observable covariates as




kt + zkt 1); (2)
where  denotes the standard normal cdf.
The vector x includes borrower and loan characteristics, including the FICO credit score,
the loan-to-value ratio, the debt-to-income ratio, the loan amount, an indicator variable
for whether the loan is a purchase or renance, and an indicator variable for whether the
borrower's income is fully documented. Additionally, the vector includes an indicator variable
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xH that takes a value of 1 if the borrower is Hispanic and 0 otherwise.
The vector w denes a set of geographic and economic characteristics, which includes an
indicator variable for loans originated in Florida, the median family income of the Census
tract relative to the median income of the corresponding metropolitan area, the share of
the minority population in the Census tract, and variables summarizing local economic
conditions such as the county-level unemployment rate and the county-level growth rate in
house prices since the previous quarter.
Our focus of interest centers on the contagion measure, reecting the adoption rate of
hybrid products at the same location in the previous period. A positive eect of this measure
on subsequent adoption rates of hybrid mortgage products is viewed as evidence of contagion.
Let Qkt denote the set of all subprime originations in our sample that were originated in
Census tract k during period t. We denote qkt as an element of this set. Next, we dene the
subsets Q
hybrid
kt  Qkt as the set of hybrid mortgages among Qkt and QH
kt  Qkt as the subset
of mortgages originated to Hispanics. Using the above notation we dene two measures of



















The rst contagion measure, z1
k;t 1, is the fraction of hybrid originations as a proportion
of total originations in a Census tract in the previous quarter. A positive eect of the rst
measure on the probability of choosing a hybrid mortgage product in the next quarter is
viewed as evidence of contagion in product choice. Notably, the rst measure of contagion
is independent of the race or ethnicity of the borrower.
The second contagion measure, z2
k;t 1, is the fraction of hybrid originations to Hispanic
borrowers as a proportion of total originations to Hispanic borrowers in a Census tract in
the previous quarter. Again, a positive eect of this measure on the probability of adopting
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a hybrid product in the subsequent period is viewed as evidence of contagion. Notably, the
second measure is particularly relevant for Hispanic borrowers.
We are interested in capturing the idea that the measures of contagion are reinforced by
the ethnicity of the borrower especially if the borrower is Hispanic. To capture this eect,
we introduce an interaction term to the regression as follows. In the model of discrete choice
we allow for the interaction of the contagion measure zkt 1 with the ethnicity indicator, xH.




kt + zkt 1 + zkt 1  x
H): (5)
Our object of interest is the marginal eect of the interaction term, which we compute
according Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004). These studies show that
the sign of the coecient for the interaction term, , does not necessarily reect the sign
of the interaction eect. Furthermore, standard summary measures of marginal eects are
inappropriate and instead, the marginal eect of the interaction should be computed for each
observation in the sample.6
4 Summary statistics
In this section, we provide an overview and summary statistics of the merged data set.
Our sample comprises of a little over 1.2 million individual rst-lien mortgages originated
in California and Florida from 2004:Q2 to 2005:Q4 (the initial quarter, 2004:Q1, is used
in the calculation of the contagion measures). Table 1 presents summary statistics for the
entire sample of loans, table 2 presents similar statistics for the sample of hybrid loans, and,
nally, table 3 presents summary statistics for the sample of non-hybrid loans. All tables





@x , if variable x is continuous, or as the discrete change in probability,
Pr[y=1jX]
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)jx=0g, if variable x is binary. The marginal eect of the interaction of a discrete variable xH with a
















. Standard errors of all these eects are obtained with the delta method, as usual.
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additionally report summary statistics for the subsamples of loans originated to Hispanic
and non-Hispanic borrowers.
The last three columns of table 1 provide us with the details of the entire sample of
originations. The average loan amount is around $300,000 dollars. The mean FICO score
is around 650 and the mean loan-to-value ratio at 76% is less than the 80% required on
conventional mortgages without private mortgage insurance. More than half (58%) of the
originations are renances and little less than half (46%) of the loans provide full documen-
tation on the loan application. For the purposes of this study it is important to note that
about 57% of originations in our sample are hybrid products and 29% of originations are to
Hispanic households.
From table 1, we observe that, on average, originations of hybrid loans to Hispanics
(65%) make for a higher share of the hybrid products than in the overall sample (57%).
On average originations to Hispanics in our sample appear to have marginally lower FICO
scores, marginally higher loan-to-value ratios, higher debt-to-income ratios and lower levels
of full documentation on the mortgage. This suggests that originations to Hispanics have
ex-ante riskier characteristics than other originations.
Next, we compare originations of hybrid products in table 2 with originations of other
(non-hybrid) products in table 3. Notably, 33% of hybrid products are originated to Hispanic
borrowers whereas the share of non-hybrids among Hispanics is only 23%. Originations with
hybrid products have a signicantly lower FICO scores on average|there is almost a 60
point dierence in the mean scores of hybrid originations vis- a-vis non-hybrid originations.
In comparison with non-hybrid originations, hybrid originations have higher loan-to-value
ratios and higher debt-to-income ratios. At the same time, hybrid originations also have a
higher percentage of loans that are renances or have full documentation on the mortgage.
The loan amount is typically lower on hybrid originations.
Table 2 also demonstrates that among hybrid mortgage originations, there is not much
to distinguish between borrowers that are Hispanic with those who are non-Hispanic. Most
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mortgage and borrower characteristic such as FICO scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-
income ratios are comparable. However, we do observe that Hispanic borrowers have a
smaller proportion of loans that are renances and have full documentation on the mort-
gage. Almost in the same fashion, table 3 shows that within non-hybrid mortgage origi-
nations, there is not much distinguishing borrowers who are Hispanic from those who are
non-Hispanic.
5 Results
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the estimation. Table 4 presents the results for the
specications with the rst contagion measure, dened as the count of hybrid products as a
share of all mortgage originations in the Census tract. Table 5 presents the results with the
second contagion measure, dened as the count of hybrid products originated for Hispanics as
a share of all mortgage originations for Hispanics in the Census tract. The tables report the
estimated coecients and the average marginal eects (calculated for all variables including
the interaction term averaging the measures dened in footnote 6 over all observations) for
various specications with dierent sets of regressors.7
In addition to the contagion measure, the Hispanic indicator, and the interaction of the
two, we consider additional regressors according to 3 specications. Model 1 includes bor-
rower and loan characteristics and the following geographic characteristics: an indicator for
Florida, Census tract income, and Census tract minority share. Model 2 includes addition-
ally house price growth and unemployment rates measured at the county level. Finally,
model 3 includes also quarterly dummies.
The estimated coecients in tables 4 and 5 indicate that a standard set of borrower-
and loan-level characteristics have the expected sign on the probability of adoption of hybrid
products. For example, a higher FICO score, a higher origination amount, and whether the




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































origination is a renance reduce the likelihood of acquiring a hybrid product. On the other
hand, a higher loan-to-value ratio, a higher debt-to-income ratio, and whether the origination
has full documentation increases the probability of acquiring a hybrid. The average marginal
eects indicate that the magnitude of these eects is economically important. An increase
of one standard deviation (about 70 points) in FICO scores relative to the mean (about
650 points) reduces the likelihood of acquiring a hybrid by about 20 percentage points, on
average. Similarly, a one-standard deviation increase in the loan-to-value ratio (about 13
percent) relative to the mean (about 76.5 percent) increases the probability of acquiring a
hybrid product by about 10 percentage points, on average. For any given specication, the
eect of these covariates is similar across the two contagion measures.
Tables 4 and 5 indicate that both contagion measures have a positive eect on the adop-
tion of hybrid products. In other words, on average, the origination of hybrid products
responds to past choices of the average population (the rst contagion measure), and to
the past choices of the Hispanic population (the second contagion measure). The results
indicate, however, that the two alternative contagion measures produce marginal eects on
the adoption probabilities of dierent magnitude. In table 4, a 10 percentage-point increase
in the rst contagion measure, namely the share of hybrid products in a given Census tract
in the previous quarter, leads to an increase in the likelihood of acquiring a hybrid product
of about 80 to 100 basis points. (The contagion variable varies between 0 and 1. There-
fore, a coecient of 0.0841 for the average marginal eect under Model 3 corresponds to an
increase of about 80 basis points in the probability of hybrid origination in response to a
10 percentage point increase in the contagion measure: 0:0841  0:10 = 0:0084.) In table
5, a 10 percentage-point increase in the second contagion measure, namely the share of hy-
brids acquired by Hispanics in the previous quarter, leads to an increase in the likelihood
of acquiring a hybrid product of about 30 basis points. (A coecient of 0.0267 for the av-
erage marginal eect under Model 3 corresponds to an increase of about 30 basis points in
the probability of hybrid origination in response to a 10 percentage point increase in the
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contagion measure: 0:0267  0:10 = 0:0027.) Note that the marginal eects described here
refer to the partial eect on the probability of acquiring a hybrid product averaged across all
borrowers irrespective of ethnicity. Since the rst contagion measure is dened independent
of ethnicity, whereas the second contagion measure includes it, it is not surprising that the
magnitude of the rst is larger.
The results from both sets of models also indicate that Hispanics are more likely to
acquire a hybrid product than other borrowers by about 3 percentage points, and these
eects are statistically signicant in both sets of models.
Considering the marginal eect of the interaction term we nd that according to the
average eect reported in table 4, the average marginal eect of the interaction is not sta-
tistically signicant in any of the specications of the regressors. In contrast, the average
marginal eect of the interaction is statistically signicant in all the specications of table
5. The coecients indicate that, on average, the dierential marginal eect of the contagion
measure for Hispanics relative to other borrowers is slightly larger than the magnitude of the
average contagion eect for the entire sample of about 30 basis points for a 10 percentage
point increase in the contagion measure.
As suggested by Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004), computing
the average of the marginal eect of the interaction term may obscure the eects across
dierent observations. Hence, a plot of the marginal eects of the interaction against the
predicted probability of each observation helps illustrate better the impact of the interac-
tion term. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the marginal eect of the interaction, along with the
corresponding z-statistics that illustrate their statistical signicance across all observations,
and are also plotted against the predicted probability of hybrid origination. In the rst case,
the interaction eect has an inverted S-shape and varies from positive to negative values.
However, except at the extremes of the predicted probability, the interaction eect is not
statistically signicant. In the second case, the interaction eect has an inverted U-shape
and is always positive, reaching a peak of about a 45 basis points change in the hybrid origi-
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nation rate to a 10 percentage point increase in the contagion measure. The peak is reached
near the region of a predicted probability of hybrid adoption of about 50 percent.
It is interesting to note that the narrower denition of contagion which conditions not
only on product type but also on ethnicity generates an interaction eect that is positive and
statistically signicant for all the observations in the sample in gure 2, while the interaction
eect of the broader denition of contagion is statistically signicant only for observations
with very low or very high values of the predicted probability of hybrid origination in gure
1.
We interpret these results as evidence of dierential eects of contagion among Hispanic
borrowers relative to non-Hispanic borrowers. In other words, there seems to be an exter-
nality in the mortgage choices of Hispanics, in that they respond to the previous choices
of Hispanics. In contrast, Hispanics do not seem to respond to the previous choices of the
average population dierentially from other borrowers.
6 Conclusion
Since the subprime mortgage crisis, a signicant volume of literature has emerged examining
the causes and consequences of the subprime debacle. Fewer studies have examined the
emergence, growth, and rapid expansion of subprime mortgages since 2000. In this respect,
the signicant growth of short-term subprime hybrid products from less than 5% of all
subprime mortgages originated in 2000 to almost 75% of mortgages originated in 2006 has
remained a mystery to most researchers. Considering the signicant evidence showing that
most subprime borrowers lacked signicant nancial sophistication, this rapid expansion of
hybrid products is even more puzzling.
In this paper we attempt to shed light on this puzzle from the perspective of the bor-
rower. We argue that neighborhood contagion may have a signicant role to play in the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Marginal interaction eect. Contagion Zk
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Figure 2: Marginal interaction eect. Contagion Zh
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sion of subprime hybrid products during this period. Several other proximate causes|such
as steepness of the yield curve, the aordability of hybrid products in an environment of
rapid house price growth, aggressive lending eorts by brokers and banks in an eort to
capture market share|may also be responsible in the widespread use of hybrid products in
the subprime universe.
However, this study adds to this list of proximate causes, arguing that neighborhood
contagion eects of product adoption may have a signicant role to play as well. First,
the proportion of hybrid subprime products in a given location increases the likelihood that
a subprime borrower at the location will adopt a hybrid product subsequently. Notably,
this eect of product adoption is independent of the race or ethnicity of the borrower.
Further analysis reveals a second neighborhood contagion eect that depends on whether
the borrower is Hispanic. We observe a strong contagion eect on the adoption of hybrid
mortgages for Hispanics in the following way: An increase in the origination of hybrid
products among Hispanic subprime borrowers as a proportion of total hybrid products at a
given location increases the likelihood that a subprime borrower who is Hispanic will adopt
this product subsequently. This second eect is similar to the rst, but signicant only for
Hispanic borrowers. Our interpretation of this result is that, while the contagion eect holds
in general for all products, its eect is signicantly more pronounced when one considers the
adoption rates of Hispanic borrowers.
While this study is a rst step towards understanding the role of neighborhood contagion
eects in increasing the appeal and widespread dissemination of subprime hybrid products,
further analysis is needed to determine the mechanism by which this growth occurred. In
this respect, we are agnostic about the exact mechanism by which these neighborhood eects
determined mortgage choice. We hope that this phenomenon will merit further research in
light of the evidence presented here.
23REFERENCES REFERENCES
References
C. Agnell and C. D. Rowley. Breaking New Ground in U.S. Mortgage Lending. Outlook,
FDIC, Summer 2006.
C. Ai and E. C. Norton. Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models. Economics Letters,
80:123{129, 2003.
G. Bhardwaj and R. Sengupta. Subprime Mortgage Design. Working Paper 2008-039D,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, August 2011.
A. K. Bhattacharya, F. J. Fabozzi, and W. S. Berliner. An Overview of Mortgages and
the Mortgage Market. In F. J. Fabozzi and S. V. Mann, editors, The Handbook of Fixed
Income Securities, pages 487{512. McGraw-Hill, 2005.
S. Bikhchandani, D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch. Learning from the Behavior of Others: Confor-
mity, Fads, and Informational Cascades. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(3):151{170,
Summer 1998.
D. G. Bocian, K. S. Ernst, and W. Li. Unfair Lending: The Eect of Race and Ethnicity
on the Price of Subprime Mortgages. Technical report, Center for Responsible Lending,
2006.
D. G. Bocian, K. S. Ernst, and W. Li. Race, Ethnicity and Subprime Home Loan Pricing.
Journal of Economics and Business, 60:110{124, 2008.
B. Bucks and K. Pence. Do borrowers know their mortgage terms? Journal of Urban
Economics, 64(2):218{233, 2008.
H. Cai, Y. Chen, H. Fang, and L.-A. Zhou. Microinsurance, Trust and Economic Develop-
ment: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Field Experiment. Working Paper 15396,
National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2009.
24REFERENCES REFERENCES
M. J. Courchane, B. J. Surette, and P. M. Zorn. Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions
and Outcomes. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 29(4):365{392, 2004.
S. A. Gabriel and S. S. Rosenthal. Credit Rationing, Race, and the Mortgage Market.
Journal of Urban Economics, 29(3):371 { 379, 1991. ISSN 0094-1190.
GAO. Nonprime Mortgages: Analysis of Loan Performance, Factors Associated with De-
faults, and Data Sources. Report GAO-10-805, U.S. Government Accountability Oce,
August 2010.
L. George and J. Waldfogel. Who Aects Whom in Daily Newspaper Markets? Journal of
Political Economy, 111(4):765{84, August 2003.
K. Gerardi, L. Goette, and M. Stephan. Financial Literacy and Subprime Mortgage Delin-
quency: Evidence from a Survey Matched to Administrative Data. Working Paper Work-
ing Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, April 2010.
G. Gorton. The Panic of 2007. In Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System,
Proceedings of the 2008 Jackson Hole Conference. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
August 2008.
A. Haughwout, C. Mayer, and J. Tracy. Subprime Mortgage Pricing: The Impact of Race,
Ethnicity, and Gender on the Cost of Borrowing. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Sta
Reports Sta Report no. 368., Federal Reserve Bank of New York, apr 2009.
D. R. Haurin and S. S. Rosenthal. Language, Agglomeration and Hispanic Homeownership.
Real Estate Economics, 37(2):155{183, Apr 2009.
P. H. Hendershott, W. C. LaFayette, and D. R. Haurin. Debt Usage and Mortgage Choice:
The FHA-Conventional Decision. Journal of Urban Economics, 41(2):202{217, 1997. ISSN
0094-1190.
25REFERENCES REFERENCES
J. M. Lacko and J. K. Pappalardo. Improving Consumer Mortgage Disclosures: An Empir-
ical Assessment of Current and Prototype Disclosure Forms. Sta report, Federal Trade
Commission Bureau of Economics, June 2007.
A. Marshall. Principles of economics. Macmillan, eighth edition, 1920.
C. Mayer, K. Pence, and S. M. Sherlund. The Rise in Mortgage Default. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 23(1):27{50, Winter 2009.
E. C. Norton, H. Wang, and C. Ai. Computing Interaction Eects and Standard Errors in
Logit and Probit Models. The Stata Journal, 4(2):154{167, 2004.
A. Pennington-Cross and J. Nichols. Credit History and the FHA-Conventional Choice. Real
Estate Economics, 28(2):307{336, 2000.
C. Reid and E. Laderman. The Untold Costs of Subprime Lending: Examining the Links
among Higher Priced Lending, Foreclosures and Race in California. Technical report,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2009.
J. Waldfogel. Preference Externalities: An Empirical Study of Who Benets Whom in Dif-
ferentiated Product Markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 34(3):557{568, Autumn
2003.
J. Waldfogel. Does Consumer Irrationality Trump Consumer Sovereignty? The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 87(87):691{696, November 2005.
26